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Chapter 6 
Bulgaria's Private Security Industry 
Philip Gounev 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the transformation of the private security industry in 
Bulgaria.1 The case of Bulgaria is of special interest for several reasons. 
First, it highlights a wide range of problems posed by the transformation of 
the private security industry between 1990–2006. These include corruption, 
organised crime, and a lack of capacity at the state level which has hampered 
oversight of the industry. Secondly, security privatisation has reached such 
profound proportions that about nine percent of all employed males in Bul-
garia are now engaged in a private security-related activity. Thirdly, for most 
of the 1990s the private security companies (PSCs), particularly those in-
volved in racketeering, were part of the public and political life to such an 
extent that numerous media reports and surveys provide valuable opportuni-
ties to examine the Bulgarian case. Therefore, the Bulgarian experience pro-
vides an important opportunity to identify ‘lessons learned’ that may be of 
benefit for other transition countries with active private security sectors. 
The central argument put forward in this chapter is that effective regu-
lation of the private security industry depends on a range of factors linked to 
security governance including issues of resources, organised crime, and cor-
ruption. Understanding the underlying factors that contributed to the estab-
lishment and transformation of the private security industry is important for 
several reasons. First, it demonstrates the limitations of ‘best practices’ mod-
elled on developed countries. Second, it suggests that looking at PSCs 
strictly from a security perspective might not be sufficient; also needed is an 
understanding of broader issues including the role of the judiciary, the in-
formal economy, criminality and the broader framework of government ca-
pacities. Finally, considering the factors that undermine PSC regulation sug-
gests that privatisation should be approached differently in countries in tran-
sition in comparison to developed countries. 
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This chapter lays out chronologically the development of the private 
security industry from 1990 to 2006, while highlighting its effect on state 
and human security. It analyses the challenges faced by Bulgaria and the 
factors that contributed to the transformation of the private security sector 
from the perspective of security governance. The chapter concludes with a 
number of policy recommendations drawn from this analysis. 
The Emergence of Privatised Security 
The recent history of PSCs in Bulgaria provides an experience quite different 
from many other countries not only in the EU but also in Eastern Europe. 
For much of the 1990s Bulgarian organised criminal groups, and the PSCs 
they controlled, were powerful enough to influence not only politics but the 
life of the average citizen. The names of the main PSCs were well known 
and became synonymous with crime, extortion, violence and fear. Fresh 
memories of these experiences have made Bulgarian society’s perceptions of 
PSCs quite different to that of many Europeans. 
During the early 1990s extensive lay-offs within the police and the 
military left tens of thousands of former security officers unemployed. The 
army was downsized from 150,000 in 1989 to 39,000 in 2001. The police 
force was also reduced as State Security (the former secret police) was dis-
banded and along with it close to 30,000 police and security officers were 
laid off. There were several possible career paths for laid-off law-
enforcement and military officers. Some used their connections to start busi-
nesses; many of those established private security companies. Others used 
their relations with the underworld to become involved in criminal activities. 
Three periods are discussed below in terms of the history of Bul-
garia’s PSCs. In the early 1990s, many professional athletes were left with-
out jobs. Secondary boarding schools, specialised in training of professional 
athletes, could not offer employment prospects to their graduates. These 
schools became the breeding ground for a new criminal class in Bulgaria, 
which includes many of the present-day underworld bosses as well as many 
of the country’s nouveaux riches. They facilitated the establishment of a 
social network of young, aggressive men with connections to security ser-
vices (as the two main sports clubs in the country were established under the 
auspices of the police and the army). Some started their careers in Central 
Europe, engaging in auto theft, currency fraud or pimping, while others re-
mained in Bulgaria, specialising in robbery, prostitution rings and protection 
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rackets targeting fledgling businesses. They also provided protection for 
street gangs against the police or rival criminal groups.2 
The Violent Period 
The first private security companies were founded in late 1991 after an in-
ternal decision to relinquish the state monopoly on force in order to meet the 
needs of unemployed professional athletes and laid-off security officers.3 At 
that time no legal provision regulated private security activities in any way.4 
On the one hand this change created the opportunity for laid-off military and 
law-enforcement officers to apply their skills in the private sector. Many of 
them took up this opportunity. Some of the largest present-day PSCs were 
started by such individuals in that period (1991–1994).5 On the other hand, 
criminal groups drawn from former wrestlers, boxers and martial arts experts 
grasped this opportunity to put a legal face on their activities.6 This second 
group of PSCs continued to be involved in racketeering, particularly of the 
retail and hospitality industries. Agricultural markets and tourist resorts 
around the country began to be controlled by different groups, with signifi-
cant effects on the national economy – bankrupting companies unwilling to 
give in to racketeering, distorting competition, fixing prices at high levels, 
and concentrating resources within preferred companies.  
These conditions differ from those in other countries in the region. 
Former Yugoslav countries, such as Macedonia or Serbia, maintained high 
numbers of military and police personnel for most of the 1990s due to the 
ongoing conflicts in the region. Organised criminal groups there engaged 
primarily in trafficking and smuggling activities. In Romania and Hungary, 
even though the military and police personnel were gradually reduced, the 
state maintained a strong hold on security for most of the 1990s, keeping 
crime under control and the criminal justice systems were much more effi-
cient than in Bulgaria.7 In addition, all of these countries lacked the social 
network of criminalised athletes that created the backbone of PSCs engaged 
in protection rackets. Closer to the Bulgarian example is the case of Russia, 
where rampant crime and the state’s inability to provide security to busi-
nesses created strong demand for private security provision.8 As in Bulgaria, 
the founders of many of the most prominent Russian criminal groups were 
former athletes with state boarding school backgrounds.9  
During this initial period there were at least four sources of demand 
for private security services in Bulgaria. First and foremost, the weak judi-
cial and law-enforcement systems led to a pervasive sense of impunity. The 
absence of effective enforcement presented new opportunities for organized 
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criminal groups to extort money and prey on small businesses. During that 
period the criminal justice system had practically come to a halt. In 1993, for 
instance, the courts convicted three times fewer individuals than in 198910 
while the crime rate more than doubled.11  
On the other hand, with transformation of the economy only slowly 
starting to take place, there were no adequate mechanisms for debt collection 
and almost all PSCs carried out this function through intimidation and vio-
lence. The scale of the grey economy during most of the 1990s approached 
40 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP).12 As Frye has argued in his 
research on Poland and Russia, businesses within the grey economy do not 
have access to official law enforcement mechanisms and therefore rely on 
private protection.13 In addition, the downsizing of the police force left un-
guarded many sites which still needed protection. These included large state-
owned enterprises, government and municipal buildings, hundreds of mili-
tary warehouses, sea and river ports. Finally, the increase in crime, particu-
larly racketeering, created further demand for private protection. 
The lack of government control and regulation of PSCs instilled an in-
creasing sense of insecurity among businesses and citizens. Intimidation 
tactics involved beatings, mutilations, bombings and murders (see Graph 
6.1), which reached record-high levels in 1994. PSCs owned by athletes 
racketeered entertainment establishments, retail establishments and restau-
rants, smaller offices, and hotels in sea-side resorts. PSCs founded by former 
security officers tended to insert themselves into a legitimate niche market 
created as a result of the reduced state-provided protection of large state-
owned enterprises, banks or infrastructure (ports, sports facilities, schools, 
etc.). 
Due to the staggering scale of racketeering and the impunity of those 
involved, very few people saw a reason to report such incidents to the police. 
Graph 6.1 shows that protection rackets peaked in 1993–1994, illustrated by 
the record high levels of bombings and murders in these years. At the same 
time registered racketeering cases numbered only a few hundred per year 
and less than a dozen individuals were sentenced, highlighting the large 
number of unreported racketeering incidents. 
It was at the height of this crisis that the government took the first 
steps towards regulating the PSCs, by adopting in March 1994 Ordinance 
№14 for the Issuance of Permits for Guarding of Sites and Private Individu-
als by Physical and Legal Persons.14 This ordinance mandated that a PSC 
could not be registered if one of the owners or its employees had criminal 
records, were under investigation, or had not paid taxes. The law left signifi-
cant discretion to local Area Police Departments (APDs) to decide on which 
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PSCs to register. Since practically all the owners of PSCs involved in racket-
eering had criminal records or were under investigation, the law was used to 
force the closure of such PSCs. 
Graph 6.1. Racketeering and Violence in Bulgaria 
 
Sources: Ministry of Interior; National Statistics Institute 
From Protection to Insurance Rackets 
The new law marked the beginning of the second period (1994–1998) in the 
history of Bulgarian PSCs. The closure of notorious companies such as VIS-
1 or Club 777 had an unexpected, negative effect that led to the widening of 
the influence of organised criminal groups. In response to losing their legal 
status the owners of the banned PSCs transformed their businesses into in-
surance companies. Thus, for example, the owners of VIS-1 registered an 
insurance company VIS-2 and Club 777 was transformed into Sila. Some 
former security officers, particularly from the Ministry of the Interior’s Anti-
terrorist Unit, already involved in criminal activities, saw this as a new op-
portunity to register companies. The re-branded PSCs continued their protec-
tion racketeering practices with the main difference being that they changed 
their legal face from the provision of security to provision of 'insurance'. 
However, the insurance rackets significantly widened the range of criminal 
opportunities with insurance forced not only on businesses but also on pri-
vate individuals’ motor vehicles and homes, or government and public insti-
tutions.15  
The two archrivals VIS-2 and SIC each had nationwide coverage. The 
presence of a sticker of one of the major insurers guaranteed that property 
would not be damaged or stolen. The sticker acted in effect as static protec-
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tion because any attempt to steal or break into insured property that had a 
VIS-2 or SIC sticker would cause a team of security guards from the insur-
ance company to be sent to recover the object or seek compensation for the 
inflicted damage. For instance, instead of receiving a payment from their 
insurance company, insured owners of vehicles that had been stolen were 
simply given a replacement – usually another stolen vehicle. During this 
period organised criminal groups became increasingly interested in circum-
venting the international embargo against the former Yugoslavia and in de-
veloping illegal markets (consumer goods and drugs smuggling, prostitution 
rings, etc.). In addition, the economic crisis of 1996–1997 made racketeering 
even less profitable, and interest gradually started to shift away from this 
activity.  
In 1997 the new government of Ivan Kostov made a political decision 
to challenge the violent insurance companies. In April 1997 Interior Minister 
Bogomil Bonev met with the heads of all the top organised crime-affiliated 
insurance companies and informed them that they would have to discontinue 
their racketeering and extortion practices.16 In July 1998 amendments in the 
Law on Insurance17 marked the beginning of a new period. The new provi-
sions specifically banned: (1) insurance companies from performing private 
security activities (Art.4); (2) PSCs managing or owning insurance compa-
nies, whether fully or in part (Art 9.9); (3) actuaries or insurance agencies 
from being owned, managed, or linked to PSCs (Art.13.3, Art.43.3, Art.43.5, 
43v); (4) insurance companies from conducting any activities through legal 
or private persons that provide private security (Art.31.6); and (5) most im-
portantly, the law banned with immediate effect any insurance companies 
that had carried out private security activities. Added to this was a require-
ment for insurance companies to re-register as part of the new requirements 
with a minimum capital that most criminal insurance companies did not 
have. In practice these amendments brought about, if not the closure, at least 
a significant transformation of PSCs turned insurance companies.18 
Attempts at Regulation 
The closure of the insurance companies involved in racketeering marked the 
beginning of a new period of increasing regulation of PSCs in Bulgaria. In 
February 1999 a short-lived Ordinance №39 and the June 2000 Ordinance 
79 on the Conditions and Order for Carrying out Private Security Activities 
developed further the PSC legislation. The new legislation was accompanied 
by stringent enforcement measures. In August 2001 police throughout the 
country carried out inspection visits on 847 PSCs, 2338 sites with armed 
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guards and 1079 sites with unarmed guards, reporting that ‘dozens of viola-
tions’ had been identified and given administrative sanctions and 69 had 
been issued warnings.19 The regulation of private security activities should 
be seen in broader perspective, however, as a number of other regulations 
and laws were being developed simultaneously relating to the use of firearms 
or transportation of precious cargo.20 
Despite this flurry of legislative and law-enforcement activity, racket-
eering continued to be relatively widespread. A crime victimisation survey 
of businesses in Sofia, conducted in 2000 for the United Nations Interre-
gional Institute on Crime and Justice, provides a snapshot of the use of pro-
tection rackets.21 The survey findings indicate that 11.4 percent of businesses 
stated that protection rackets were either common or very common in their 
line of business. When asked if they had been racketeered, 7.7 percent of 
businesses responded positively. For 78.9 percent of them, this had happened 
less than five times during 1999 but for the rest it was almost a monthly ex-
perience. The respondents pointed to ‘organised crime groups’ (79 percent) 
and rival businesses (21 percent) as the main perpetrators. The United Na-
tions Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) study (see 
Graph 6.2) shows that at that time the phenomenon of protection rackets was 
still much more widespread in Bulgaria than most East European countries 
that had not been part of the former Soviet Union. 
The great majority of racketeering, however, remained unreported. 
Only 7.9 percent of businesses in Sofia responded that they had reported all 
instances of racketeering to the police during 1999. The main reason for the 
lack of reporting was fear of reprisals (63 percent). Two other reasons men-
tioned were that the police were not interested (40 percent) and were 
unlikely to be able to help (23 percent). It is probable that at the height of the 
racketeering boom (1993–1995) an even greater share of the crimes re-
mained unreported. Under pressure to meet requirements for Bulgarian 
membership of the EU and NATO, by 1999 the criminal justice system was 
more functional and the courts convicted four times more individuals than 
they did in 1993 (from 6,935 to 29,391). 
The most significant step towards regulation of the PSCs was the ac-
ceptance in 2004 of the Law on Private Guarding Activities.22 The official 
rationale of the law was that it meant to bring Bulgarian legislation regulat-
ing PSCs up to the standard of the best European practice, particularly that 
of the Scandinavian countries.23 The law strengthened the definitions of pri-
vate security activities and introduced an obligation for all PSC employees to 
attend a six-day training programme. The new law mandated that the private 
security activity licence did not have a time limit (unlike the previous three-
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year limitation) and that all PSCs had to register under the law. From a busi-
ness standpoint this latter development was positive as it reduced signifi-
cantly the bureaucratic process. The removal of limits on licences also had a 
positive effect by allowing the police to focus on monitoring or controlling 
PSCs rather than administrative issues related to the renewal of licences. 
Added to this were explicit limitations on the use of automatic weapons by 
PSC personnel. 
Graph 6.2. Have you been asked money for protection? (only capital cities) 
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Security Governance and the Private Security Business in Bulgaria 
The factors driving the transformation of PSC regulation in Bulgaria have 
changed over the years, ranging from the state’s own desire to exert some 
level of control over the means of force, to external (NATO or EU) pressures 
to deal with organised crime. The initiative behind the most recent regula-
tory effort (the Law on Private Guarding Activity) could to a large extent be 
attributed to the PSC industry itself, which recognised the need for a well-
regulated relationship with the police, clear rules in the security services 
market, and as little bureaucratic muddle as possible. NATO and the EU 
have played no particular role in shaping the present regulatory framework 
or practices but were instrumental in intensifying the political will to crack 
down on organised crime-related PSCs in the late 1990s. Civil society or-
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ganisations and communities have not taken a particular interest in this issue, 
which is reflected in the present Law on Private Guarding Activity, where 
there are no provisions or institutional platforms that allow for civilian con-
trol or complaints mechanisms. 
The present Law on Private Guarding Activities leaves oversight of 
the private security industry entirely to the police and the Ministry of the 
Interior, from granting and revocation of licenses, to control over the use of 
firearms and administrative sanctioning of irregularities. No provisions are 
made for oversight by local government, the National Parliament or other 
government authorities. The judiciary only becomes involved in resolving 
disputes between the PSCs and the police or other plaintiffs. A trade union 
of private security guards was only established in September 200525 and has 
yet to have any effect. In addition, five different associations of PSCs sprung 
up involving the majority of PSCs.26 These first steps towards self-regulation 
included the establishment of a common code of ethics, and working to-
wards improving the public image and trust in PSCs. However, despite the 
establishment of common standards, there is no oversight or monitoring 
mechanism that allows such associations to adequately enforce their ethics 
codes. 
Oversight Capacity 
Being the only institution responsible for overseeing the private security 
industry, the interior ministry faces a number of challenges. The government 
has allocated few additional resources to overseeing the private security in-
dustry. The licensing work was simply added to the tasks of local police 
departments without adding staff specifically involved with licensing and 
oversight. Control is carried out mostly on an ad hoc basis and an indication 
of the lack of proper resource management is the incomplete knowledge of 
the Ministry of the Interior of the size of the private security industry; the 
ministry has officially stated on various occasions that there are around 
130,000 guards working in private security companies in Bulgaria.27 A 2005 
survey of businesses revealed, however, that in fact there were only around 
54,000 security guards working for PSCs, while the rest (around 70,000) 
were employed in in-house security teams. Data presented by the National 
Statistical Institute (NSI) also indicate that security companies at the end of 
2004 employed some 42,733 personnel. One possible explanation for the 
discrepancy between the NSI and the survey figures is that a significant 
number of PSC guards work without contract and are paid ‘under the ta-
ble’.28 In addition, since most PSCs employ guards who are equipped with 
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their own personal firearms, the MoI does not have a clear picture of the 
number of firearms possessed by PSCs and in-house security teams. 
Two recent incidents further highlight existing difficulties in control-
ling the large private security sector in Bulgaria. On 23 November 2005, the 
citizens of the village of Gabra (near Sofia) staged a protest against the deci-
sion of the Sofia municipality to use an abandoned local mine for depositing 
the city's garbage. The protesters clashed with about 50 private security 
guards that the mine owner had hired from a number of different PSCs. Ten 
protesters were injured. The police detained 34 guards and found that none 
of them had the right to guard the mine and that 13 of them had criminal 
records. During the police investigation all guards declared that they hap-
pened to be walking around the mine and had not been hired.29 And in the 
end no PSC was sanctioned. This case illustrates the readiness of some PSC 
guards to break the law as well as the problems with the current Law on Pri-
vate Guarding Activity that allows individuals with criminal records to be-
come guards.30 
In another case, the private guards of a wealthy land-owner who had 
illegally taken over public forest lands attacked two forest rangers, beating 
and robbing them of their arms and ammunition. Three hundred local inhabi-
tants signed a letter to the MoI and the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture 
protesting against lawlessness and the inability of police to control the secu-
rity guards, who regularly abused the local population and patrolled the re-
gion on horses with automatic weapons, wearing bullet-proof vests and 
masks.31 
Crime and PSCs 
A more detailed illustration of the lingering challenges in overseeing the 
private security industry is presented in an analysis of PSC involvement in 
racketeering or illegal dispute settlement. During the past six years such 
influence has subsided. In the 2005 business crime victims survey, only 1.3 
percent of the respondents indicated that they had been asked for protection 
money during 2005 – a significant reduction from the 2000 level of 7.3 per-
cent.32 Overall, however, 8.8 percent of the companies had been victims of a 
range of threats and extortion (protection money being only one aspect of it). 
Generally, small companies with fewer than 10 employees were up to five 
times more likely to fall victim to such crimes than companies with over 100 
employees. In only 7 percent of cases though were PSCs directly blamed as 
the perpetrators of such threats and extortion. In the other cases, local organ-
ised crime groups (33 percent) and competition (26 percent) were named as 
Bulgaria’s Private Security Industry 119 
the main culprits. Nevertheless, the data suggests that some PSCs remain 
involved in criminal activities. The levels of reporting threats and racketeer-
ing to the police were still low – 70 percent were not reported – but 22 per-
cent had reported such crime, which is a clear increase from the earlier fig-
ure of 7.9 percent. However, this is significantly lower than other types of 
crimes that generally have reporting rates of over 50 percent. 
In 2005 the key reasons for not reporting incidents to the police were 
the perception that the police cannot do anything about it (31 percent), and 
that this is a problem that has nothing to do with the police (31 percent). One 
key difference with the 2000 survey's reasons for not reporting is the issue of 
reprisals; while in 2005 only 21 percent mentioned this as a reason for not 
reporting, in 2000 63.3 percent mentioned it as a reason. This indicates 
changing patterns of action by the perpetrators and decreased levels of vio-
lence by PSCs. This supports the more general observation that organised 
crime in Bulgaria has gone through a period of a high level of violence in the 
early 1990s towards reduced levels of violence and, as discussed in the fol-
lowing section, its substitution by corruption as a tool to achieve its goals.33 
Corruption and Conflicts of Interest 
A major gap in the present legislation is the lack of sufficient checks and 
balances to ensure adequate measures against corruption. This encompasses 
a broad range of issues concerning both public administration and the private 
sector.34 There are various ways in which corruption has affected the over-
sight of PSC services. Some of the problems stem from the close relations 
between the police and the former military or police-turned-PSC-owners. 
Other issues are more systemic and are related to the more general problem 
of corruption in Bulgaria.  
The most widespread aspect of corruption relates to the issue of public 
procurement contracts. In 2003, 54 percent of all companies (not only PSCs) 
in Bulgaria admitted to having paid bribes to obtain a public procurement 
contract. In 2005 the share fell to 35 percent.35 There is no reason to believe 
that private security companies were in any way an exception to such prac-
tices. Such levels of corruption, though, take on an entirely different mean-
ing when concerning public procurement contracts for provision of security 
services to military sites, the Kozlodui nuclear power plant, international sea 
or river ports (i.e. international border crossings). It is probably the issue that 
most directly questions the limits of security privatisation particularly in 
countries with high levels of corruption. During the past decade, security for 
hundreds of military sites, most major international ports (such as Varna, 
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Russe and Burgas), power plants and other key infrastructure sites has been 
contracted out to PSCs.36 These had formerly been guarded by police or 
military forces.  
 
At the highest level, corruption could be described in terms of conflict 
of interest or influence-peddling by politicians who own PSCs. The present 
legislation fails to impose adequate measures against such practices. There 
are three models of corrupt practices. One involves using political influence 
to ensure that the regulation over certain PSCs is more or less strict, depend-
ing on the politician's business interests. The second, which is more widely 
applied, is to gain public procurement contracts through influence over other 
government agencies, possibly through kickbacks. The third is trading in 
influence where a given company could be forced to (or even would will-
ingly) give a contract to the politician’s PSC, and as a result expect certain 
favours in return.  
Given that the majority of the private security companies in Bulgaria 
are either staffed or run by former police officers, assigning the oversight of 
PSCs solely to the police leaves significant room for informal relations be-
tween PSCs and their regulators. It is well known that some influential poli-
ticians or their families still own PSCs. For example, allegations of undue 
influence have been made against both the well-known Scorpio PSC regard-
ing contracts to guard the National Customs Agency37 and against Ipon con-
cerning the contract to guard municipal property in Sofia.38 Both companies 
have ties to prominent politicians. In another case the PSC Khan Krum, 
owned by an off-shore company and linked to a former Member of Parlia-
ment and member of the ruling coalition party Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms, was awarded a contract to guard the Kozlodui Nuclear Power 
Plant (the only one in the country).39  
Certainly, the above cases do not suggest any easy answers and it 
could be argued that private security companies are one means of circum-
venting widespread corruption within the police and the military. This may 
be true but salaries in most PSCs are lower than those offered by the police 
or the military, with evident consequences in terms of incentives to corrup-
tion. Also, unlike the police or military (where there are internal affairs de-
partments), PSCs do not have instruments and resources to fight internal 
corruption. Further to that, the difficulties described in terms of oversight 
and control of PSCs suggest that much remains to be done to further develop 
the current regulatory framework and strengthen the oversight capacity of 
the government. Such initiatives should take into account the underlying 
factors that drive the demand for private security. This is important, because 
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while certain demand-driven factors are perfectly legitimate (for instance 
increased security around a private defence production facility), others (like 
collection of debts) are the result of existing legislative gaps or inefficient 
work of law enforcement agencies. 
The Demand for Security Services 
Despite the challenges described above there remains a significant demand 
for private security services. There are various factors that fuel such demand. 
The 2005 CSD/Vitosha Research survey indicated that perceptions about 
crime were by far the leading factor, but the grey economy, experiences of 
crime, and racketeering were also factors. 
Graph 6.3. What were the reasons you hired a PSC? (% of respondents) 
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Fear of Crime 
The fear of crime is by far the leading factor that has driven the demand for 
private security services. During the 1990s, such fears were fuelled by the 
PSCs themselves, as many of them were involved in the criminal activities 
described above. In recent years, though, these fears have been maintained 
by growing media attention on criminality.40 During the 2001–2005 period, 
overall crime significantly declined in Bulgaria. The reasons for this de-
crease are complex, including demographic factors (rapidly declining popu-
lation, particularly young males), decreasing unemployment, rising incomes, 
and an increase in the prisoner population. The crime prevention effect of 
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private security companies is not clear. Analysis indicates that companies 
using the services of PSCs have a lesser chance of being victims of burglary. 
However, the likelihood that they would become victims of theft from out-
siders or employees or become victims of threats and extortion is not af-
fected and they remain vulnerable to such crimes. 41 
Economic Factors 
A number of economic factors drive the demand for PSC services. First, it 
has been argued that the informal economy in itself attracts PSCs because 
contracts in the grey sector cannot be enforced through the legal system and 
official law enforcement channels, therefore opening a market niche for pri-
vate enforcers.42 The shrinking of Bulgaria’s informal economy over the past 
few years43 has probably contributed to the reduced negative influence of 
PSCs.  
Another source of demand for PSCs’ services has been created by the 
inefficiency of Bulgaria’s court system, which provides a slow and unreli-
able system of debt collection. In 2005 the courts had blocked 375,000 debt 
claims worth 917 million euros. At the same time debt among companies 
and individuals has mounted to 3.5 billion Euro.44 A judge passes an average 
of six collection verdicts per month, which means that most debt claims will 
remain stuck in court for years. Even slower is the actual enforcement of 
verdicts, which usually takes years.45 Therefore a demand has been created 
for debt collection services, some of which are provided by legitimate debt 
collection agencies, but often there are ‘special units’ within PSCs which 
also provide such services using threats and intimidation to collect debts.46 
The introduction of private collection judges, due to start work during 2006, 
is expected to gradually help make official debt collection more enforceable.  
Finally, hiring a private guard makes sound business sense to many 
companies because this is still a relatively inexpensive service and certainly 
cheaper than hiring military and law enforcement personnel. Furthermore, it 
seems that hiring private security guards has become to many something of 
an ‘industry standard’, particularly for retail or wholesale enterprises since 
instead of quality of service or price serving as the main criteria to hire a 
PSC, business owners remain cautious, pointing to reputation and trust as the 
two key criteria in selecting a PSC. 
Although financially attractive, private security guards are often not 
properly trained and managed to provide quality services. A recent incident, 
in which the Bulgarian Football Union tried to save money and paid a PSC 
SOT 161, instead of the police, to guard a football match proved disastrous. 
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The company failed to control a fight between hundreds of hooligans, and 
the police were called in to intervene.47 Specific skills are moreover needed 
when guarding key infrastructure or military sites. For instance, the question 
whether PSCs are fit to guard complex border sites such as international sea 
ports is a valid one. There are no specific conditions or skills required from 
PSCs bidding for such contracts, even though guards are likely to be exposed 
to challenges related to smuggling of drugs, arms, or human beings. 
There are at least two reasons why PSCs are less efficient at providing 
certain specialised services. One is insufficient training and skills; police 
have more extensive and continuous training in comparison to the three-day 
general course required for security guards. Secondly, PSC guards have nei-
ther the authority nor the deterrent effect of the police; they do not have suf-
ficient powers to detain trespassers or to use force. And attacks on PSC 
guards are not sanctioned any differently than attacks on regular citizens, 
unlike attacks against the police. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Per capita, Bulgaria is near the top of the European list measuring the ratio 
of private security guards to police officers. Thus, for each Bulgarian police 
officer there are two guards employed by private security companies and 
about three more private guards in in-house security teams.48 This fact high-
lights the need for even greater resources and measures to ensure adequate 
control over PSCs. 
Implementing the regulations to divert PSCs from racketeering in se-
curity provision has been a long process that has depended on political will, 
the capacity to enforce new legislation, economic development, the appear-
ance of more profitable criminal opportunities and the influx of a critical 
mass of former police and military officers with a better work ethic and pro-
fessional standards. However, despite the positive developments that led to 
the decriminalisation of significant parts of the private security industry, a 
new set of challenges has emerged in recent years connected by a lack of 
oversight capacity, corruption and lingering crime-related problems. 
The transformation of the private security industry is a process that 
involves a broad range of legislative and administrative reforms and meas-
ures related to firearms regulations, corruption, crime, judicial and law en-
forcement capacity, and more broadly to the business environment. 
Countries in transition in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union, 
where former police and military personnel (due to downsizing of the secu-
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rity apparatus) constitute the backbone of the private security industry, pose 
their own challenges. Adopting best practices in PSC regulation from West-
ern Europe is a first step. While adopting a sound law is relatively easy, fail-
ure to adapt it to the local context can render it inadequate when facing the 
realities of countries where corruption and organised crime have undue in-
fluence. The following recommendations, drawing on the Bulgarian experi-
ence, could certainly be taken into account when drawing up legislation and 
establishing PSC control mechanisms in other countries in transition. 
• Provision of adequate resources for oversight is key. One possible 
approach would be to allocate funding for licensing, levy fines, or 
even introduce additional fees that could support the oversight body. 
Another solution could be to broaden the range of institutions that 
oversee the PSC industry, thus splitting the cost across several agen-
cies, possibly even mandating the establishment of an industry-funded 
independent monitoring body. 
• Providing additional bodies with functions in oversight of PSCs. 
Although the police are certainly best fit to control and monitor PSCs, 
local government could be allotted a role. There are two important 
dimensions of the oversight – licensing and monitoring. One possible 
way would be to establish an inter-agency licensing mechanism, so 
as to avoid undue influence over the licensing process by former po-
lice officers. Another would be to concentrate the licensing process 
within regional centres, instead of keeping responsibility with the lo-
cal police stations or municipalities. This would reduce the likelihood 
of inappropriate relations. Monitoring could also be improved by es-
tablishing multi-agency monitoring teams. Thus not only the police, 
but also labour conditions inspectorates, civil defence agencies, fire 
departments, or an industry body could be involved in such teams, in 
order to provide more objective and balanced assessment. 
• Stricter regulation of in-house security. Given that in-house security 
guards outnumber PSC guards, there is no reason to have lesser regu-
lation of this sector. In fact it has been argued that they are de facto 
PSCs registered simply as companies with only one department – in-
house security.49 Therefore, in-house security teams should be put on 
an equal standing with regard to training, responsibilities, and registra-
tion requirements. 
• Stricter rules for individuals with criminal records. Criminal inci-
dents involving PSC staff have highlighted the danger to the public 
from guards with criminal records. At least two steps could be taken 
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to provide safeguards. First, security guards with criminal records 
should be barred from working in a PSC if they re-offend. In the case 
of Bulgaria this should include any violent crime as well as ‘hooligan-
ism’, which usually captures all small-scale violent and threatening 
behaviour. A second approach would be to set up higher criminal li-
ability of PSC guards, i.e. that criminal offences committed by secu-
rity guards should result in harsher penalties (higher fines or longer 
sentences) than would be given to ordinary citizens.    
• Widening opportunities for citizens to seek legal remedy. In light 
of the public threat that some PSCs have posed and given the fact that 
PSC management remains well-connected to law enforcement struc-
tures, alternative sanctions and remedies outside the police should be 
made available. One potential ally is the ombudsman institution, while 
local government bodies could also be allotted a more significant role. 
• Increasing PSC liability for actions of their personnel. At present 
there is a whole raft of practices aimed at reducing company liability 
at the expense of individual guards. These range from having no offi-
cial contractual relationship between guard and company to obliging 
guards to obtain personal firearms permits and use their own weapons 
in the course of their daily work, to not bearing responsibility for 
semi-legal guarding or debt-collection activities that guards unoffi-
cially carry out on behalf of their employer. Increased liability would 
force the company to more strictly control the actions of its personnel 
and to limit their involvement in illegal practices. 
• Higher standards for companies guarding critical infrastructure. 
Existing regulations do not require a higher level of training, special 
skills, or higher liability for companies providing security services for 
key security infrastructure, such as ports, military facilities or nuclear 
power plants. If such requirements are fulfilled, the cost of private se-
curity is likely to surpass the cost of hiring law enforcement person-
nel. Thus, from a financial or security point of view it makes little 
sense to employ PSCs under present conditions. 
• Measures against conflicts of interest. Although some of the above 
recommendations aim to diminish corruption, there should be some 
direct legislative provision as well. The absence of rules and regula-
tions against conflict of interests of government officials or their fami-
lies that own PSCs has created conditions for corrupt practices and 
trading in influence. Legislation could include provisions barring 
owners or individuals related to PSCs from holding public office. 
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Despite the impressive transformation through which Bulgaria’s pri-
vate security industry has gone since 1990, the need for further reforms, in 
terms of creating the conditions for more effective, well-managed and de-
mocratically-governed security provision, remains clear. The case of Bul-
garia highlights some of the difficulties that future European Union initia-
tives to establish common standards for PSC regulation might encounter. 
Countries in East-Central Europe, like Poland, Bulgaria or Hungary, where 
corruption is higher and the PSC sector larger than in most West European 
countries, need more regulatory and legislative safeguards to ensure ade-
quate control. 
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